Fact Check: Iran's Government Historically Restricts Internet During Civil Unrest
What We Know
The Iranian government has a documented history of restricting internet access during periods of civil unrest. Notably, during the protests in November 2019, which erupted in response to a significant increase in fuel prices, the government implemented a near-total internet shutdown, reducing internet traffic to just 5% of normal levels (source-1). This drastic measure was part of a broader strategy to control information and suppress dissent, allowing the government to carry out violent crackdowns on protesters with reduced visibility and communication (source-2).
The Iranian government has invested heavily in developing a domestic internet infrastructure known as the National Information Network (NIN), which enables it to maintain control over internet access and restrict connections to the global internet (source-1). This system allows the government to filter content and manage which platforms citizens can access, effectively isolating them from international information sources (source-3).
Analysis
The evidence supporting the claim that Iran restricts internet access during civil unrest is robust. Reports from multiple sources confirm that the Iranian government has routinely employed internet shutdowns as a tactic to manage civil disturbances. For instance, during the 2019 protests, the government’s decision to throttle internet access was a calculated move to limit the flow of information and prevent the organization of protests (source-1, source-6).
The credibility of these sources is high, with organizations like Reporters Without Borders ranking Iran among the worst countries for press freedom, indicating a systemic approach to censorship (source-2). Furthermore, the historical context provided by the development of the NIN illustrates a long-term strategy by the Iranian government to control digital communication, particularly in response to past uprisings like the Green Movement in 2009 (source-1).
Critically, while some argue that internet fragmentation is not absolute due to the global nature of internet protocols, the Iranian case demonstrates a significant level of control and censorship that aligns with the claim (source-1). The government's ability to maintain a domestic internet while restricting international access is a clear indication of its intent to manage civil unrest through digital means.
Conclusion
The claim that Iran's government historically restricts internet access during civil unrest is True. The evidence from multiple credible sources illustrates a consistent pattern of internet shutdowns and censorship as tools for suppressing dissent and controlling the narrative during times of political instability. The Iranian government's investment in the National Information Network further underscores its commitment to maintaining this level of control.
